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This article aims to decipher the interplay on the semiotic notions of signifier, signified and referent coined by semiotician Saussure (1857-1913) in Donald E. Pease’s 2009 work New American Exceptionalism and in two late twentieth - early twenty-first-century American novels: Breat Easton Ellis’s American Psycho and Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis. The analysis of the semiotic arrangement of the selected works will allow a critical insight into the constitution of specific sign systems in contemporary American Exceptionalism that will shed light onto the distortion and corruption of the foundational values of the American nation, as exemplified in the selected novels.
In this regard, Ellis and DeLillo will be envisaged as two fiction writers who, through their engagement with postmodern aesthetics, incorporate this semiotic interplay at the level of their own sign systems. Through their various representations of a reality that is flattened out by the two-dimensional culture of the image, I will show how this paradigm is integrated into the texts, as each writer, in his own fashion, underlines the conditions for semiotic manipulation in contemporary culture.
In more detail, I will analyse how a trope of surface reality (Baudrillard) is characterized in these works through a movement that starts with a disconnection between signifier and signified and that proceeds with the symbolic discarding of the sign’s referent (Ellis), resulting in the capacity to corrupt reality through language itself. Ultimately, I will decipher how DeLillo’s Cosmopolis epitomizes the dematerialisation and dissolution of referents in cybercapitalism through the self-referentiality of the sign that the novel purports.








It is a remarkable feature of contemporary American literature to offer virulent ripostes to what it regards, often with great discernment, as an affliction of its national culture. As they give expression to vitriolic portrayals of a reality that discloses signs of the corruption of national ideals, postmodern writers – amongst which Bret Easton Ellis and Don DeLillo – denounce the flaws of contemporary America by exemplifying the predicaments of the culture they are immersed in.
The writings thus produced embody a reflection on the nature and modus operandi of power in postmodern societies. By nature, a dominant power manifests itself in the appointment of a framework within which it promotes its own interests and secures its position. In a democratic context, power relies on persuasion to win popular consent, which is its ultimate justification. The contemporary cultural environment of the United States, however, tends to blur the lines of the very authority of power, as postmodernism suggests. Nonetheless, an acting power – regardless its atomized nature – reveals itself, crucially, when its interests diverge from the Res Publica: this is where the American nation loses its alignment with its historical fundamentals.​[1]​ In such cases, power becomes, essentially, a conflicting force: it is the subject that plots the betrayal of contemporary culture vis-à-vis the original values and political pact that the nation was founded upon. Donald E. Pease, in his work on new American Exceptionalism (2009), highlights this hiatus between the fundamental values of the American nation and the contemporary practice of the state. In doing so, Pease brings to the attention of the reader the mechanics of persuasion that power delivers in order to win consent and achieve its own interests. It is this device of persuasion that my article aims to pinpoint, as Bret Easton Ellis’s American Psycho (1991) and Don DeLillo’s Cosmopolis (2003), through their insights into postmodern reality, concomitantly dissect the functioning of the language of power. The critique addressed by Ellis and DeLillo to contemporary American culture will be deciphered with a particular concern for the semiotic operations that take place within the sign systems that their respective novels feature.
To begin with, I will analyse the essential corruption that lies at the core of contemporary American culture – and especially within the very notion of a new American Exceptionalism as defined by Donald E. Pease. In that sense, contemporary writers of fiction produce texts that, in their very use of language itself, are symptomatic of the contemporaneous cultural moment of late twentieth and early twenty-first century. I will thus decipher how the two contemporary American writers I selected, namely Breat Easton Ellis and Don DeLillo, exemplify and satirize the semiotic deviation of today’s culture through their respective novels, ultimately bringing about a salient critique of contemporary America.

In his attempt to define the nature of a new American Exceptionalism, Donald E. Pease coined the following definition: 'American exceptionalism includes a complex assemblage of theological and secular assumptions out of which Americans have developed the lasting belief in America as the fulfillment of the national ideal to which other nations aspire' (Pease 2009: 7). Pease then offered a more geopolitical elucidation, as recent historical events were reconsidered. He deduced that the new American Exceptionalism was 'the name of the much-coveted form of nationality that provided U.S. citizens with a representative form of self-recognition across the history of the cold war' (Pease 2009: 7). Pease, in linking deliberately the production of recent American Exceptionalism to reactions to historical conditions, underlines the advent of States of Exception. These States of Exception have been implemented after major historical events which were regarded as traumatic attacks on national integrity by the state. They refer, namely, to the National Security State (set up in 1950 in response to the Cold War events), and the Homeland Security State (enforced in 2001 in order to legally back up the military and surveillance operations of the Global War on Terror launched by George W. Bush after the 9/11 events).
These States of Exception have had crucial effects both in terms of national identity that American citizens have construed of themselves, and on the political rationale of the country. Indeed, the regime that characterizes a State of Exception is

marked by absolute independence from any juridical control and any reference to the normal political order. It is empowered to suspend the articles of the Constitution protective of personal liberty, freedom of speech and assembly, and the inviolability of the home and postal and telephone privacy. (Pease 2009: 24)

In other terms, they are unconstitutional: the state deliberately subtracted itself from the legal historical foundations of the nation, as it enforced a super-legislative order that betrayed some of the fundamentals of the American Constitution. As the National Security State was brought into effect during the Cold War era, the state sought the consent of its citizens to provide the legal exceptionalism it naturally championed with popular legitimacy. It thus shaped an ideological framework that aimed at delineating and containing the American citizens' experience of, and relationship to, historical events. This framework is, in substance, what Pease terms a 'state fantasy’, which is defined as the 'dominant structure of desire out of which U.S. citizens imagined their national identity' (Pease 2009: 1).
Pease's state fantasy is, in fact, an act of co-production: it emerges from a fabricated dialogue between the state and its nationals, so that the directed consent thus obtained remains endowed with the appearance of democratic legitimacy. Citizens are involved in the creation of state fantasies because the state crucially needs popular approbation of its symbolic authority: 'Over and above its monopoly of legitimate violence, the modern state relied on fantasy for the authority that it could neither secure nor ultimately justify' (Pease 2009: 2). It appears, then, that the function of a state fantasy is highly ideological: it is both 'a political doctrine as well as a regulatory fantasy that enabled U.S. citizens to define, support, and defend the U.S. National identity' (Pease 2009: 11). As it shapes national consent, the state fantasy is an efficient tool to legitimate States of Exception. It champions a national discourse that operates a normative influence on the subjects and on their relationship to the political field altogether, while it circumscribes and annihilates historical interpretations and ideological alternatives that do not fit in the rationale of the state fantasy. In the words of Pease, 'th[is] political rationality […] instituted a political sphere as the terrain wherein political actors would normatively interiorize the rules and regularities upon which the new game of politics depended for its legitimation' (Pease 2009: 25). In the case of the National Security State, 'U.S. citizens embraced the state's exceptions by taking up liberal anticommunism as a homogenizing political ethos' (Pease 2009: 27). Thus, the state fantasy could freely develop, as it was equated with a new form of American Exceptionalism; that is to say that it was devised as symptomatic of a nation whose citizens regarded themselves as 'exceptions to the rules that regulated the World of Nations and [who] identif[ied] their will with the will of the State of Exception that governed the international political order' (Pease 2009: 24). This makes American Exceptionalism both the motor of, and ultimate justification for, States of Exception.
There is, then, in what has been termed state fantasy, a re-writing of the national historical narrative for ideological purposes. Pease pinpoints that, in the twentieth century, the construction of this national mythology is based on a substraction from the 'laws of historical motion to which Europe was subject' (Pease 2009: 10). In other terms, the American nation thought of itself as ahistorical.​[2]​ This analysis reinforced the anti-communism that has been restlessly conveyed by the state fantasy: since communism was seen as a substantial threat to the historical existence of the nation itself, the national mythology championed its antithesis – free-market economy – as paramount to guarantee the integrity of its territory, and made it a condition sine qua non of the very national identity. As Pease remarks: ‘This newly instituted political sphere was described as having been established by a rule of law that demanded as the precondition for its regulatory powers the autonomy of capital, owners, and the market’ (Pease 2009: 25).
The mythology thus erected by means of state fantasy is the essence that fuels new American Exceptionalism as defined by Pease, as it deftly seeks to conceal the historical complexity of events that the nation has gone through to this day. Some of these historical events constitute, de facto, national traumas that are antagonistic to the mythology of national exceptionalism and cannot fit in it: they are referred to by Pease as 'state exceptions’ and correspond to the circumstances, amongst others, that resulted in crises such as the Japanese internment camps, Operation Wetback, or, more recently, the detention camp at Guantanamo Bay.​[3]​ These events have been redesigned to various extent by means of the state fantasy in order to match the  horizon of expectation of American Exceptionalism. As Pease puts it,

by staging fantasies that produced an imminent justification of the national Security State's power to construct exceptions to its own rules, American exceptionalism articulated the interconnection among law, war, and citizenship in ways that fostered U.S. citizens' primordial attachments to the State of Exception. (Pease 2009: 32)

We can thus reach the conclusion that the state fantasy, as one of the ideological foundations of contemporary American Exceptionalism, is but a falsification and instrumentalisation of history by the state for the sake of the enforcement of States of Exception that have been consented by popular adhesion to a fabricated national mythology.
We may gain significant insight into this chasm between the the mythology of new American Exceptionalism and historical facts as we turn to semiotics. Ferdinand de Saussure (1857-1913) split the linguistic sign between signifier and signified.​[4]​ The signifier, which is 'a sound-image, [...] is not the material sound, a purely physical thing, but the psychological imprint of the sound, the impression that it makes on our senses' (Saussure 1916: 66). As to the signified, it is its 'concept', that is, the mental image of the signifier (Saussure 1916: 66). This classification will be completed by the referent, which is the actual thing that the concept, or signified, refers to.
If we devise Pease’s conception of contemporary American Exceptionalism as a self-contained sign system, we may observe that its signs – the State of Exception as its signifier and state fantasy as its signified – are disconnected from their referents. Put in another way, the state fantasy, as ‘the dominant structure out of which US citizens imagined their national identity' (Pease 2009: 1), is at odds with the reality of historical reference, since this latter requires to be blurred or lost in the presentation of national history to avoid any interference with the signs of American Exceptionalism. What semiotics reveals here with striking clarity is the disjoining of the signs of new American Exceptionalism from the actuality of historical reference. This dissociation is exemplified with critical distance in the two works of fiction that I mentioned above, in the form of an interplay with their own sign systems in particular. As scholar David Cowart remarks, ‘DeLillo’s engagement with the postmodern […] is […] adversarial’ (Cowart 2003: 226). This statement is no less true for Ellis: the selected novels from these two writers will be devised as symptomatic reactions to the corruption of the signs of American Exceptionalism that contemporary American culture entails. To accomplish this task, we will now pay attention to the way that Ellis and DeLillo, in their own fashion, used and corrupted sign systems in their respective novels.

To begin with, the nature of the dominant power in Ellis’s American Psycho shall be deciphered. American Psycho relates the existence of Patrick Bateman, a wealthy Wall Street executive working in finance. Bateman’s way of life is fairly typical of the yuppie culture of 1980s New York, until he commits shocking acts of mutilation and murders for no apparent reason. Bateman, as a serial-killer in disguise who is tied ‘libidinally and aggressively to the commodity form’ (Colby 2011: 81), perplexes the reader more than once as the lines get blurred between fiction and reality. The subject of power that articulates the rhetoric of persuasion in American Psycho is not the narrator himself; instead, it is to be found in the cultural paradigm that it presents its readers with.
In effect, the novel reifies symptomatic aspects of the dominant institutional and ideological mindset of the 1980s in North America in the form of a frantic consumerism that is conveyed by the development of mass commodification of the real. Such proceedings have naturally emerged from the global, all-encompassing quality of contemporary capitalism that postmodernist theorists have evidenced.​[5]​ In re-cathecting the politics of the contemporary, American Psycho integrates the codes of postmodernity, as the novel ‘satirizes and exaggerates our consumer society and the time-space compression which leads to instantaneity, disposability and instant obsolescence’ (Baelo-Allué 2011: 28). Ellis, in fact, introduces a paradigm of surface where signs may be freely dissociated from their referents without deprecating the protagonists’ apprehension of reality.
This postmodern trope of surface reality is thoroughly interiorized by Ellis’s protagonists, and especially Bateman: as the intradiegetic narrator of the novel, he articulates both the narrative and his identity in function of the signs of the commodity society he is immersed in. As a consequence, his existence, along with the one of the other protagonists of the novel, is objectified and envisaged in terms of signs, which are made explicit specifically by means of brand names throughout the novel. For instance:

I have taken out a gold Cross pen to write down the name of the restaurant in my address book. Dibble is wearing a subtly striped double-breasted wool suit by Canali Milano, a cotton shirt by Bill Blass, a mini-glen-plaid woven silk-tie by Bill Blass Signature and he’s holding a Missoni Uomo raincoat. […] I am wearing a mini-houndstooth-check wool suit with pleated trousers by Hugo Boss, a silk tie, also by Hugo Boss, a cotton broadcloth shirt by Joseph Abboud and shoes from Brooks Brothers. […] I used Listerine afterwards and my mouth feels like it’s on fire but I manage a smile to no one as I step out of the elevator, […] swinging my new black leather attaché case from Bottega Veneta. (Ellis 1991: 61)

Beyond the comic effect provoked by the obsession of the characters for luxury commodities, it is in fact language itself which is commodified. As signifiers accumulate in the form of brand names, the corresponding signifieds that are conceived in the mind of the reader align themselves with the images of luxury and opulence fabricated by the communication agencies of the historical power identified in the novel, namely global capitalism. This semiotic arrangement is artificial: it is primarily fabricated by the economic power. More precisely, in the historical and cultural context represented in American Psycho, it is the advertising industry that takes on the role of the state in its appointment of a fantasy that Pease brought to light in the politics of new American Exceptionalism. In the contemporary culture of global capitalism, the advertising industry is the agent in charge of the mythification of reality through a process of semiotic substitution of its signifieds. Just as the conception of a state fantasy is an act of co-production that involves U.S. citizens in its actualisation, advertisement requires the imaginative abilities of consumers to attain its goal of persuasion. At this point, we may notice that Ellis’s novel concerns not the mere neutralisation of the signifieds, but their very replacement by the ones appointed by the dominant power.
The transaction of the rhetoric of persuasion is thus accomplished, as sign systems themselves have been co-opted by the matrix of global capitalism. Language does not belong to itself any longer: by means of a substitution of its signifieds by private interests, the signs of Ellis’s novel exemplify their ultimate subversion and replacement by the ones authorized by corporate power, as shown in the former quotation. In the end, the very names of the brands mentioned in American Psycho enact the colonisation of sign systems by the articulated consortium of private interests that contemporary capitalism features. Collaterally, this absorption of language by the private results in the reduction of the public sphere, which is significantly hindered by the process of co-optation that global capitalism involves. As we are about to see, the subjectivities of men and women are constantly reduced and tend towards a state of objectification.
As language is re-routed towards – and redefined by – the private sphere, the line between subjects and objects becomes tenuous. In fact, the tendency towards commodity fetishism that the novel displays applies to both objects and subjects without discrimination. Bateman’s strict relying on signs is the origin of violence in American Psycho, as he no longer differentiates consumer objects from human beings. The fundamentals of his social standards betray this confusion, from the constant objectification of individuals that he operates to the serial character of his killings. Besides, the principle of interchangeability that the culture of commodification brings forward participates in the dehumanising of characters in the novel.
This confusion between subjects and objects accounts for the commodification of women in the novel especially. As Bateman refers to them as ‘hardbodies’ (Ellis 1991: 36), he interprets them as mere objects of consumption and sexual gratification, when they are not devised as objects of murder. Their objectification responds to their identification as a commodity sign: they become consumable and interchangeable, with no consideration for human subjectivity. In fact, Bateman’s misogyny extends to misanthropy, as he conceives human beings in general as super-objects – that is, as objects that accumulate, organize and hierarchize other objects – instead of actual subjects. In this regard, a striking illustration of the dehumanising process that sweeps over American Psycho may be found in the following remark formulated by Price, Bateman’s colleague: ‘I’m resourceful… I’m creative, I’m young, unscrupulous, highly motivated, highly skilled. In essence what I’m saying is that society cannot afford to lose me. I’m an asset’ (Ellis 1991: 3). In this quotation, Price ultimately equates himself with capital. This instance outlines the liquidation of subjectivity in the postmodern pattern of contemporary culture; it also displays the expression of consent framed by the very objects of power. As the individual’s desires are profiled by the advertising agencies of power to match with the interests of the economic apparatus, the latter sculpts and defines its own reality in return. We have seen that this new reality, whom signs are co-opted and redesigned by the agencies of persuasion of global capitalism in this instance, fits in the postmodern paradigm of surface reality that Ellis depicts in his novel. Notwithstanding, it posesses another semiotic characteristic that deserves to be underlined.
As we refer to the first quotation of American Psycho upon which we have commented,​[6]​ we may notice that, beyond the penetration of the corporate within the sign, a process of permutation between subjects and signs takes place. The former quotation may be read as such: ‘[…] Dibble is […] Canali Milano, […] Bill Blass, […] Bill Blass Signature and […] Missoni Uomo […]. I am […] Hugo Boss, […] Hugo Boss, […] Joseph Abboud and […] Brooks Brothers’ (Ellis 1991: 61). As Bateman’s enumeration of his possessions marks an excessive identification of the subject with the commodity form, we get to the realisation that what matters in his very ontology is the mere brand name – the sign – instead of its referent. As literary critic Naomi Mandel remarks, in the novel ‘words are cut off from referential connections to things in the world, from categories of value or meaning, and even from their own histories’ (Mandel 2011: 27). Put concisely, signs have become self-referential. Hence, as Ellis shortcuts signs from their referents, the sign performs its self-referential function. This semiotic process glosses over Baudrillard’s lament, who, in his radical assumption that ‘the truth, reference, and objective causes have ceased to exist’ (Baudrillard 1981: 344), apprehended the trope of surface reality ingrained in postmodernity that American Psycho cracks wide open, and that grounds DeLillo’s Cosmopolis.

In a related manner, DeLillo’s Cosmopolis (2003) offers a salient semiotic commentary upon the making of reality in postmodernity. Unequivocally, DeLillo’s novel articulates the symptomatic disappearance of referential frames – hence of referents – from the grid of twenty-first-century Western reality, which, as an effect, produces a ‘kind of weightless temporality which has ‘lost its narrative quality’’(Boxall 2013: 27). Essentially, this process corresponds to the ultimate semiotic corruption of sign systems by the regime of power, as it operates a shift from a trope of surface reality to one of self-referentiality of the sign. Thus, this last section will investigate how DeLillo, after Ellis, engages in a representation of contemporary American culture that completes the splitting of the sign from its referent; I will show, as an effect, how this separation deletes the referential frame from the screens of postmodern reality.
In fact, the origin of the semiotic hiatus that permits the corruption of sign systems in postmodern culture is envisaged by Cowart in these terms:

Two-dimensionality is the signature of the age. […] [The postmodern subject’s] image exemplifies a radical denial of the psychological, aesthetic, cultural, and graphic third dimension. The validity of this idea has become a matter of widespread if largely unconscious recognition. One knows, perhaps without being able to articulate the insight, that one cannot pierce the surfaces of contemporary life to encounter some deeper, truer reality. (Cowart 2003: 3)

Cowart’s conclusion brings up the question of the origin of power in an age of simulacra. As with Ellis’s American Psycho, power in Cosmopolis is no less ambiguous. The ubiquity of the contemporary trend of cultural globalisation triggers a process of totalisation that, paradoxically, blurs the lines of authority and causality: it suggests a conception of power that lies more in the very interaction of the parameters of postmodern reality than in its agents themselves. In this regard, DeLillo’s Cosmopolis offers a relevant illustration of how reality is constructed – or rather de-constructed – in contemporary American culture. This reality, as I suggest in this article, can be deciphered through the analysis of the interplay between the signs and their corresponding referents that the novel features. Crucially, the conditions of its making match with the semiotic predicament that guarantees the possibility of operations and manipulations of sign systems that the new form of American Exceptionalism, as identified by Pease, purports.
 Cosmopolis deals with Eric Packer, a 28-year-old billionaire trader and fund manager, who will see his fortune collapse in the space of one day in April 2000. Safe from harm in his limousine as he attempts to cross a city besieged by anticapitalist protesters to get a haircut, Eric will be led to crucial self-realisations that will dramatically change his fate. The hiatus between the sign and its referent is a recurrent pattern in Cosmopolis, which presents the reader with a wide range of intradiegetic two-dimensional figurations of contemporary reality. As Eric restlessly projects himself in the future to speculate – where, by definition, referents do not exist yet – the novel offers a parable of contemporary culture, where the digital age has taken over. As scholar Joseph Conte suggests, ‘the question of profit and loss is, in a sense, immaterial as [Eric] hedges the relative prices of currencies in an electronically connected global market. […] This is liquid-crystal globalism, virtual, instantaneous, and networked’ (Conte 2008: 182). Therefore, one object especially achieves a particularly compelling status in Cosmopolis: it is the computer. Computers, as Vija Kinski, Eric’s so-called ‘chief of theory’, points out, ‘are melting into the texture of everyday life’ (DeLillo 2003: 104). Indeed, computers screens, as they process pieces of reality, collaterally stage the hiatus between the sign and its referent in twenty-first-century cyber-capitalist culture. That is to say that they capture reality to re-present it upon their two-dimensional surface, often in the form of images and charts: ‘The screens showed money moving. There were numbers gliding horizontally and bar charts pumping up and down’ (DeLillo 2003: 63). Later:

There were three tiers of data running concurrently and swiftly about a hundred feet above the street. Financial news, stock prices, currency markets. […] The hellbent sprint of numbers and symbols, the fractions, decimals, stylized dollar signs, the streaming release of words, of multinational news, all too fleet to be absorbed. (DeLillo 2003: 80)

Put in semiotic terms, these screens display a series of signifiers that define Eric’s reality. In this sense, they encapsulate the very trope of surface reality that Baudrillard deciphered.​[7]​ As computers screens display their digital signals, their corresponding referents are physically disconnected and put into digital orbit. Although they do not disappear from the radar of the real, their relationship to the sign has become significantly indirect, since they are intrinsically mediated by technology. As DeLillo himself put it, ‘technology is our fate, our truth’ (DeLillo 2001: 37): it becomes both the experience and the horizon of the contemporary Western paradigm, as signs and referents are forced apart from one another. Vice-versa, referential reality tends to elude the signifiers that appear on screens: in this regard, Michael Chin, Eric’s currency analyst, paradoxically remarks that ‘what is happening doesn’t chart’ (DeLillo 2003: 21). This is how, through the technology of computers screens in particular, Cosmopolis exemplifies how the sign and its referent are drawn further apart in contemporary culture.
	In fact, DeLillo’s novel features innumerable illustrations of the semiotic hiatus that this article investigates. A telling example of it lies in the reaction of Elise, Eric’s wife, when she gets to see the dish that she has ordered at a luncheonette. Elise is surprised at what she is being served: ‘Is this what I wanted? […] Duck consommé with an herb twist’ (DeLillo 2003: 71). In fact, Elise is disappointed because the signifiers that she read on the menu induced a mental image (the signified) that, in the end, did not match with the reality of this sign, that is its referent. Elise’s conception of the dish, generated by a specific combination of signifiers, was but a fantasy in comparison to the actuality of the served dish. This is how DeLillo implies the power of persuasion of signifiers in contemporary reality, as he epitomizes the discontinuity between signs and referents. As such instances proliferate in the text to mimic the postmodern trope of surface reality, the author suggests a premeditated opportunity for semiotic manipulation.
	This surface reality traps subjects and objects altogether within its two-dimensional confinement. Since they present no grounding to referential reality, it is no surprise that the elements that enter its sphere of influence – especially subjects – tend to collapse or self-destroy. This abrogation of the self is idiosyncratic of both DeLillo’s prose, and of the contemporaneous reality that the novel epitomizes. As Cowart remarks, ‘as an instrument measuring what it means to live in the American present, [DeLillo] mirrors the strange fluidity and rootlessness of an age in which […] the individual’s sense of identity or self suffers progressive attenuation’ (Cowart 2003: 12). DeLillo refers to the tendency that consists in disappearing from the radar of reality more than once in the novel: for instance, Elise’s mother was convinced that her daughter ‘was dissolvable in water’ (DeLillo 2003: 18). In a similar way, Elise asks Eric where his actual office is, without getting any answer. As individuals and things dispose of their corresponding referents in postmodern reality, they are free to exist only in the form of signs. The reaction to this process of de-substantialisation comes from Benno Levin, Eric’s murderer, who stands as a principle of revolt against surface reality: ‘I began to hate […] all the numbers on my screen, and every minute of my life’ (DeLillo 2003: 142). Aware of his own consumption – and self-destruction – by the new postmodern reality, Benno attempts to overcome the contradiction of the hiatus between the signs and their referents, the visible and the invisible, and aims, arguably, to subsume the human within the referential frame of the divine.
	Although subjects and objects seem to dissolve in postmodern reality, their corresponding referents cannot be wholly deleted from the sphere of the real. Indeed, the referent may not be visible – especially to postmodern subjects, as with the pieces of information that do not chart on Michael Chin’s screen – but it is, nonetheless, actual. As Cowart suggests: ‘For, however pervasive the cultural deference to simulacra, […] one knows, after all, that a reality beyond images or words exists’ (Cowart 2003: 5). Crucially, the conditions of postmodern reality make it impossible to represent the depth of this very reality; it may occur only through the organisation of other signs that refer to it indirectly. In Cosmopolis, the impossibility of this re-presentation of reality is circumvented by means of a controlling metaphor: it is the one of the rats. The rats that the protesters evoke are displayed in the face of what they identify, from a historical materialist perspective, as the agents of power (namely the representatives of corporate power, whom Eric is a paragon). These rats, however, are only representations of the ‘spectre that is haunting the world’ (DeLillo 2003: 89); that is to say that they can refer to contemporaneous reality only symbolically. Although they re-instate a form of materiality in the digital momentum of twenty-first-century American culture, the actual referent of the rat is not – and cannot be – the one for reality stricto sensu. Therefore, the metaphor is but a mediation to allow an attempt – although unsatisfying, because indirect – at re-presentation.
The mediation that postmodern reality forces onto itself may be observed in several places in DeLillo’s novel. For instance, the reader learns that Eric’s limousine is specially cork-lined, so that the noises from the outside world do not penetrate the inside of the car.​[8]​ As a protest rages outside, Eric experiences the events through the cameras that record the images and the sounds of referential reality. This is how Eric’s access to reality is mediated by technology, as he monitors the screens for cognitive purposes. In another illustration by DeLillo of the intrinsic process of mediation of reality in postmodern culture, Elise ‘learns about the countries where unrest is occurring by riding the taxis here’ (DeLillo 2003: 16). That is to say that she perceives bits of reality and constructs an image of the world through the signs conveyed by means of language – that is, signifiers that aim at producing signifieds – without any relation to their referents. Crucially, it is the same mediation through language that defines one of Eric’s episode of sexual intercourse in the novel,​[9]​ as he and Jane Melman, his ‘chief of finance’, are ‘talked into orgasm’ (Dewey 2006: 143).
This mediation, in fact, fosters a new pattern of chain reaction where the contemporaneous reality is produced by means of signs that react to the previous signs that defined the former reality. That is to say that reality, in DeLillo’s novel, is constituted by a series of sign-reactions to signs themselves: this is how the sign has become self-referential. The autonomy of the sign is illustrated in a decisive way in Cosmopolis. As Eric speculates on a stabilisation of the yuan, the currency keeps rising, which, as an effect, provokes Eric’s financial ruin. The nature and movement of a currency, as Conte pointed out, is already an occurrence of surface reality:​[10]​ it is detached from its referent. Eric’s act of speculation, then, is a prediction that reacts to the events of surface reality that concomitantly produces new signs – the speculative act – that will exist only on the grid of surface reality. Thus, Michael Chin’s remark, ‘[w]e are speculating into the void’ (DeLillo 2003: 21), becomes entirely justified. In the end, of course, the satellitized referent may catch up with the reality of the signs – that is, Eric’s actual bankruptcy – but this quasi-transcendental reunion of the sign with its referent – of form and substance – does not happen in the contemporaneous reality of the present, which corresponds to the ‘insubstantial, instantaneous time of the software world’ (Bauman 2000: 118). This is what makes Vija Kinski think that ‘all wealth has become wealth for its own sake’ (DeLillo 2003: 77), as the signs of wealth do not need to be immediately substantiated. The referential frame of contemporary culture is thus confounded with the autonomy of the sign: ‘money is talking to itself. […] The number justifies itself’ (DeLillo 2003: 77-78). Eventually, as ‘money makes time’ (DeLillo 2003: 79), it is the contemporaneous experience of existence itself that is submitted to the paradigm of self-referentiality, doomed to chain react to signs with the means of signs, as the referent is held back in the form of a signified for futurity.
It is this predicament of self-referentiality that Pease deciphers through the case study of the detention camps of Guantanamo Bay.​[11]​ Although the existence of such camps on the Cuban island is a historical fact, it is introduced to the US citizens as a mere sign that is carefully crafted by the political power to legitimate a policy that breaks international law. In more detail, and in semiotic terms, the referents of Guantanamo are located in Cuba. Since the referential reality of the camps remains outside the US territory, it becomes easy for the power in charge to introduce elements of an ideological fantasy without being directly challenged by a referential reality experienced, and reported, by its own citizens. Thus, the American political power may freely organize an interplay on the signs of the event that, by means of an intervention on the fabrication of the signified, co-produces a fantasy in the American psyche that guarantees the tacit agreement of US citizens to governmental operations. In other words, the political power manipulates the signs of Guantanamo in a way that will win popular consent, as that popular consent will be aligned with its own plans.
This semiotic operation illustrates the co-production of a reality in the form of a reaction to the signs of a former reality. Crucially, this new reality fits in the ideological plans of the power in charge: this is how US citizens apprehend a historical reality that has been emptied of its referential substance. The semiotic operation on the sign system of Guantanamo, by means of its mediation by the political power, triggers a reaction that produces its own autonomous reality for the sake of this very power, as the referent is upheld outside the US territory and American psyche. In the end, the motif of self-referentiality of the sign in contemporary American culture gives way to an infinite (co-)production of ideological constructs that do not need referents to make, and define, the new socio-political reality: this is how, by means of semiotic manipulation on sign systems, the power in charge performs its function of domination in contemporary culture.

In the end, what Pease on the one hand, and Ellis and DeLillo on the other reveal through their focus on the interplay on sign systems enables the reader to apprehend the semiotic making of a reality appointed by the power in charge, be it political or economic. In American Psycho, private power monopolizes language in order to encode it and perform its dominating function. More particularly, what Ellis’s novel vehemently denounces through the semiotic interplay of its signs is the domination that the commodity culture exerts over persons. This domination acts, in fine, the triumph of the corporate over the individual that postmodernism vehemently castigates. In Cosmopolis, DeLillo depicts a globalized, digitalized environment that engulfs subjects and objects altogether into a trope of surface reality, where access to the referential frame is obstructed by the effects of the mediation of technology. This process completes the original semiotic disjunction between the sign and its referent: in doing so, it crucially suggests an experience of contemporaneous reality that is disturbingly self-referential. In this regard, Ellis and DeLillo’s novels, in their own ways, may be read as attempts to retrieve the foundational values of liberty and individualism that define the American nation.
Conjointly, as referents are rubbed away from the experience of postmodern reality, it becomes effortless for the dominant powers of historical development – be they economic or political – to conceal the violence intrinsic to their exercise. The technology that is associated with historical progress is, in fact, co-opted; as scholar Ruth Helyer suggests, ‘the sophisticated technology of voice-activated guns, mobile offices, and constant surveillance, rather than enhancing life, mitigates against its full and satisfying development’ (Helyer 2008: 135). This is how the dubious conditions of production of the economic apparatus simply disappear from the radar of the real. In a related manner, as we have seen, the materiality of the political antechambers of States of Exception in American history is lost in the contemporary democratic practice of the nation. The instance of the detention camps of Guantanamo Bay epitomizes this disappearance: Pease points out that they ‘occup[y] a realm outside the law in which the Emergency State’s practices were naturalized by a mythology that rendered them exempt from critical scrutiny’ (Pease 2009: 176). In this regard, the actual camps correspond to the very referents of the signs of new American Exceptionalism.
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